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21 November 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 48/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NATIONAL DEFENSE LOAN--The RPR [Rally for the Republic] is going to push the idea of a large national defense loan aimed at speeding up the nuclear defense program of France. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 31 Oct 80 p 41]

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PERIODICALS ANALYZE SENATE ELECTION RESULTS

PC Prefers Rightist Candidates

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Oct 80 pp 56-57

[Article by Irene Allier and Kathleen Evin]

[Text] On the wake of the senatorial elections the PS [Socialist Party] reviewed its situation. It found out that the balance of its losses and gains was overall positive....

In less than 3 days PS has become the locus of the appetites of its former partners and most determined adversaries following the kick it received from the PCF [French Communist Party] and the kickoff of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] on the occasion of the parliamentary session in Strasbourg. This is nothing new: Three years ago the PCF decided to bring down the PS and for a number of weeks (see LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 13 and 20 September) a part of Chirac's general staff has been ready to do everything possible to prevent Valery Giscard d'Estaing's reelection. What is new, however, is that, for the first time, the PCF has mounted an electoral action by supporting right wing candidates rather than socialists in the 28 September senatorial elections. Also new is the fact that the RPR secretary general has openly suggested to the somewhat flabbergasted parliamentarians something which was only whispered in the halls of Rue-de-Lille.

Strasbourg: In the neoclassical decor of the Josephine Pavilion, in the Orangerie Park, the RPR parliamentarians, holding a 3-day meeting, are slowly recovering on Wednesday, 1 October, from a long sight-seeing trip around the old Alsatian villages. Ever since their arrival the debate has stagnating and the feeling of embarrassment is growing. What have they to tell each other? What could they be told while their president--Jacques Chirac--seems firmly decided to keep his intentions to himself? What is the purpose of sending him urgent appeals to which he answers with a tight smile? Worse: How to face the possibility of having to choose between two candidates, a possibility which would fill any Gaullist heart with anguish?

Michel Debre is not present but his image haunts the minds. His attempt has been publicly condemned by headquarters. Nevertheless, some half a dozen people would openly take his side (Foyer, Neuwirth, Ruffenacht, and others). Monday evening, facing the press, Chirac, therefore, felt the need to open the way to other speculations. This involved the episode known as the "opening to the socialists."

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"The day when Francois Mitterrand will note the definitive break of the union of the left and say "it is over," it will be an entirely new ball game." For the sake of promoting his ideas, Chirac has suddenly discovered that, after all, "no fundamental differences exist between our membership and the PS ever since the socialists have made substantial turnabouts, particularly in matters of defense and diplomacy." Could anyone top this?

On Wednesday Bernard Pons, RPR secretary general, rushed into the breach with Chirac's agreement. It was a question of cheering up the very downhearted deputies and senators. He proceeded to "open the prospects," as the saying goes. No, Giscard will not be elected as easily as might be thought. Providing that the PCF hangs on, and it will, and the PS keeps stagnating and scores even less than expected, and if the ecologists garner a sufficient number of votes, which they will, "the mathematics of the presidential election will be thrown off." "At that point anything is possible," he shouts triumphantly. What he means is that everything is possible with the help of the disappointed socialists, beaten but freed from the PCF. Did the socialists not support General de Gaulle in 1958? "If we want to take part in the victory let us keep our cool and our clear thinking," he concludes.

Has the applauding public properly realized what this working hypothesis implied? Not a word is said. Yet, before the speech, a Franche Comte deputy had confessed in private that, "it is impossible to become buddy-buddy with the socialists on this basis; personally, I would rather resign." On the rostrum, Jean Bonhomme, deputy from Tarn-et-Garonne, had stated that, "I see red when I hear that it would be preferable to see a socialist in the Elysee rather than Giscard!" Yet, no one reacted following the speech of the secretary general, and a number of people stated privately that, in fact, 20 percent of their electorate have decided, for the present at least, not to vote for Giscard on the second round, to be willing to abstain, or even to vote for Mitterrand.

Gifts Are No Longer Needed

What is it, therefore, that encourages Chirac's general staff to rely on the future drift of the socialist party? First of all, the need to find a means to survive the presidential election. Then, the behavior of the communists in the senatorial elections. For the first time, actually, the "republican discipline" has not been effective overall. Other than in the Cantal, the communists have created difficulties for the socialists everywhere else. In the second round they have voted against any socialist who was better placed than they were, refusing to desist. In a number of cases, particularly in Allier, Cotes-du-Nord, Gers and Doubs, it even seems that some major communist voters cast their ballots for the rightist candidates. In Doubs, in particular, the PCF would rather elect a Peugeot personnel director rather than a CGT [General Confederation of Labor] worker nominated by the PS! It is in such deliberate betrayals that the RPR finds the proof that the unity strategy is agonizing. It is waiting for the confirmation to come at the presidential elections and is looking for the premonitory signs of a shift of alliances among the socialists.

Actually, the communist attitude is one of reprisals announced publically in advance in L'HUMANITE by Madeleine Vincent, member of the Political Bureau. The

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fact is that relations between the two parties had changed long before the 1977 break. Until 1973 the left was dominated by the PCF and it was the PS that kept requesting of its powerful partner "exceptions," i.e., the withdrawal of one or another communist candidate who was slightly ahead in the first round to the benefit of a socialist who was politically better placed to win the seat. After the first round of the 1973 legislative elections, however, considering that a balance had been regained, Mitterrand decided that, "we shall ask for no more gifts even if offered on a platter." It is the PCF, therefore, that is now asking for favors.

On the occasion of the 28 September balloting, it was the communists who asked in some departments, in Cotes-du-Nord in particular, that joint tickets be drawn up with the socialists for the first round. The socialists refused, satisfied with the system of withdrawals for the second round. "The PS may support the Atlantic Alliance, be to the right of Giscard or guilty of all the misdeeds of the bourgeoisie and the PCF would still not hesitate to present a joint ticket with it," ironically stated a socialist official. In any case, it would be difficult for the PCF to explain to its electorate why--unless it is for reasons of politicking--it called for single tickets for the first round with the same people it contrived to defeat in the second round, thus depriving them of two seats in Cotes-du-Nord, the first in the Gers and the second in the Doubs.

By 1 October the national secretaries of the executive bureau of the socialist party had summed up their figures. While, hypocritically, everyone was pitying them, they, personally, were quite satisfied for the following four reasons:

First, because of the progress achieved by the PS despite the artillery barrage of the PCF which, even though succeeding in limiting the socialist advances, was unable to prevent them. Furthermore, it failed to gain even a single seat as a result of its betrayal, while the socialist group became the biggest in the senate.

The second reason is that the PS won its seats alone since everywhere the voting ratios were adverse. The diabolical charm which, in the eyes of some, legitimized the unity strategy caused by the need for PCF support was broken. Since 1977 the PS was fearing the worst and the worst happened. "They dared...." and the PS survived and even advanced. Paradoxically, therefore, the dominant feeling was that of relief.

Third reason: The PS resistance forced the PCF to expose itself. The one who shouts the loudest for unity will no longer be considered the strongest proponent of unity. A tract which the PS distributed nationwide explained the communist tactics by taking the Doubs as an example.

The fourth reason is that the PCF has been able to determine the limits of its power over its electorate: In fact, in Cotes-du-Nord, Creuse, Doubs, and Gers, in particular, some big communist power brokers supported the socialist candidates ignoring orders to the contrary. Yet, these were the elite vote brokers, far more tightly controlled by the party than the electorate at large.

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No Change of Direction

The socialist conclusion is that the PS remains the leading party of the left and that the PCF would have to accept this, the more so since the PS has a powerful weapon: the jointly elected municipal councils. Unless it is willing to ignore them, in 1983 the PCF would be forced to negotiate with the PS. That is why the socialist forecast regarding the presidential elections remains relatively favorable. The prospect of the municipalities and the difficulties which the PCF has faced in controlling its big vote brokers would certainly force it to weigh the risk it would assume by issuing similar instructions to the voter at large. The test of the PCF strategy is expected to come next month, as a result of the eight partial legislative elections. It is true that the communist leadership has a wide variety of options between the slogan of "six of one-half and half a dozen of the other" and an active campaign in favor of the socialist candidate in the second round.

According to the PS the communists are currently trying to create conditions for the worst possible voting ratio. That is why, while officially reluctant to accept the "advances" of the Chirac people, the socialists are quite carefully avoiding a categorical rejection. Francois Mitterrand acknowledges that it is better to be desired than rejected. At the same time he reasserts that the break which was desired by the PCF does not lead to "any change of direction by the socialist party which will continue to call for a union of the left." Nevertheless, it is all to the advantage of the PS and the RPR to maintain an equivocal attitude, each of them hoping to draw votes from the other and at least to frighten its traditional ally.

No Chance In 1981

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 4 Oct 80 p 64

[Text] It is always pleasing to hear the advice which nonbelievers give to John Paul II or the Roman Catholic hierarchy on the policy which a good pope should follow in the interest of an updated church.

Frequently the same applies to analyses of the behavior of the communist party and to claims that the French communists are wrong in not following Berlinguer's example. "Had they really been after the power, they would not have broken the alliance with the socialists! Divided as it was last Sunday, the left has no chance for the presidential elections." The gain of nine seats by the socialists in the senate is treated almost as a failure: The growth of the socialist party is slowing down. Therefore, the left is retreating! We already heard this speech in 1976, 1977 and 1979. Yet, at each of these local elections the socialist party advanced and gained strong positions and pressure points, henceforth consolidated by the latest senatorial electoral results.

According to the Maoist Principle

As far as the communist party is concerned, it would find it to its advantage to listen to the directives issued by its secretary general rather than to take pleasure in the exegesis of the gratuitous warnings it has addressed to its partner. Georges Marchais frankly explained that he had given up the idea of

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hypocritically coming to power through the union of the left rather than through the Soviet Union. This attitude strengthened him, rather than weakening him as predicted by the specialists. The revolutionary isolation which allowed him, once again, to attract the young, tired of political deals, was yielding to the temptations of all sorts of left wing currents.

Yet, whereas the big communist vote brokers for the senatorial elections, deeply involved, obey slogans, the same does not go for the electoral mass. Political reflexes are deeply rooted in human behavior, left or right. It is true that a socialist fringe is always against a communist candidate on the second round. In the PCF an even smaller stratum refuses to support leading left wing candidates. Only the most faithful, should they receive the order, would resist the natural temptation to vote socialist.

Any other interpretation would be an illusion. Therefore, the socialist candidate for the presidential elections could be supported only by a few disappointed centrists or irredentist Gaullists. The quarrels among political bosses are generally ignored by the French. However, the weakness of their general staffs is consistent with the strength of the currents flowing through the country. This explains the seemingly incoherent and, therefore, even more dangerous, language of the socialists. Francois Mitterrand considers that his party's candidate for April 1981 can come closer to the 1974 score only through the support of a heavy communist vote. Therefore, there should be no head-on collision with the communists. That is why he shared with us his concern for Poland "whose socialist regime is incompatible with trade union pluralism." Yet, this does not precipitate his break with the French Communist Party which is openly supportive of the Soviet model. The repeated stresses of the cold war, followed by Budapest, ended eventually with a break between the old SFIO and the PCF. Today the socialists cautiously restrict the effects of their guerrilla waged against the communists. They refuse any strategy replacing that of the union of the left which they still mention while continuing, with model perseverance, their effort to develop their own strength, following the Maoist principle. They are still dreaming of a victory in their favor which would make possible the combination of the hope carried by the socialist message and the weight of the communist vote.

The Best Trump

The chances of this tactic are increased by the clumsiness of the majority parties, the rivalries among the men and the resentments among the women. Here again, however, such quarrels mean less than one may fear or hope. Nevertheless, the parties notwithstanding, the country remains split into two more or less equal masses. Polls are hardly needed to realize this. One-half remains dominated by a minority yet revolutionary bloc. France is not as yet protected from electoral ties when democracy is questioned every time.

Next spring our country will be exposed to yet another of these periods of paralyzing anguish, as the gains of 30 years of work may risk again to be lost with a cast of the dice. The running of Valery Giscard d'Estaing would reduce the uncertainties. In 7 years he has proved to all his determination and ability to navigate in the storm.

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As was the case with General de Gaulle, a certain number of French men and women belonging to the left, as the saying goes, have felt this like others. This is the best trump in France's game.

PCF Politburo Member

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 29 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Yesterday, Madeleine Vincent, member of the Political Bureau, made the following statement:

An initial examination of the senatorial election votes, held recently, shows an increased number of votes garnered by the communist candidates despite the efforts to restrict the position of the big communists voters in municipalities headed by socialists.

The unfairness of the balloting, the maneuverings of the right and the devisive policies of the socialist party have resulted in the fact that despite such progress the communist party has been deprived of a number of senatorial seats to which its influence entitled it.

The workers will particularly regret the attitude of the socialist party and its Cotes-du-Nord federation.

The results of the first round are clear: The left has about 900 votes compared with 600 for the right. These figures prove that, together, the communist and the socialist parties could have easily won all seats in the first round.

What the socialist party wanted, assuming the responsibility for the split, was clearly to block the election of a communist senator. The result can only be pleasing to the right.

Faced with this situation, as it had previously stated, in the second round the communist party supported its candidates in four departments. It is unfair and immoral for the socialist party to call upon the communist vote to have its candidates elected and do everything possible to insure the defeat of the communist candidates. The struggle for change demands clarity, loyalty, rejection of low-level politicking, and the just representation of the French Communist Party.

Elsewhere communist candidates withdrew whereas the socialist party refused a joint ticket wherever the communist candidates could have been elected, particularly in the Herault, Gard, and Haute-Garonne.

In Bouches-du-Rhone the socialist party heavily cooperated with the right to block the election of a second communist senator.

These senatorial elections prove that a real union can be established only through the struggle for the interests of the workers and for the great targets for change.

It is to this that the communist party, whose strength and influence are determining, dedicates itself.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DEBRE, CHIRAC, GARAUD ATTACK GISCARD, DAMPEN REELECTION HOPES

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 20-26 Sep 80 pp 44-45

[Article by Georges Mamy: "The President's New Enemies"]

[Text] If Giscard were ever to lose the presidential election, it would be because the right had assassinated him. Up to now, this paradoxal and sacrilegious notion has merely been borne by a timid breeze rustling through the underbrush of the majority party. But here it is, suddenly blown up because we are treated to simultaneously hearing Michel Debre's stubborn complaint, Jacques Chirac's impatient grumblings and Marie-France Garaud's haughty disavowals at the microphone of Europe 1 on Sunday. Now are these three products of Gaullism really moved by the one question which, even off scene, can take the place of determination: How to get rid of him? All three of them have for a quarter of an hour done their best to in the public eye dodge the answer to this too direct question. "It is not a personal issue," they readily claim, before raising the "real issues." But who can their indictments be aimed at and strike home at if not the man who is currently in power.

Optimists for the Left

To date, the most widespread opinion nevertheless continues to be the one one of the candidates--with no hope of winning--for the presidency, the "royalist of the left" Bertrand Renouvin, felicitously enough expressed in his report of 11 September: "The failure (of his 7 years in office) is obvious and most Frenchmen are aware of the fact but seem to be resigned to Valery Giscard d'Estaing's reelection, for a long time now felt to be an inevitability. As though, experiencing a premonition of the end of the world, each of us stretches out his hand toward the only board in sight, even though we know that it is rotted through..."

This is still what Alexandre Sanguinetti, who believes in neither Chirac, nor Mitterrand, nor in Debre's chances of success, nor in Giscard's "historic" ability either, thinks, yet concludes: "The timorous and conservative reflex is in operation and will operate during the presidential election" (LE MONDE, 19 September). And he specifically states: in favor of the "officeholder."

The analyses and plans of the three majority-party deviants seem to be organized against this inevitability. Their statements do not always agree. They

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are suspicious of or at least keep their eyes on one another. But the agreement in their criticism of the past 7 years of government and behavior of the chief of state nonetheless crowned by them in 1974 (by Debre, only after the fact, it is true) is impressive. As for Chirac and Marie-France Garaud's predictions, according to their closest associates, they are disconcerting with their optimism...for the left.

Since the beginning of this summer, Marie-France Garaud and, consequently, Pierre Juillet feel that Giscard will not capture 28 percent of the vote on the first presidential election ballot and that he will have a very hard time in making up for the lag on the second ballot. The same kind of reasoning exists in Chirac's camp where they have no trouble at all in recalling the 1974 vote. At that time, they had to capture 2 or 3 percent of the votes Chaban-Delmas would probably have won just to assure Giscard the 32 percent indispensable, according to these sharpshooters, for a candidate of the right to be assured of victory on the second ballot: "We were barely successful (32.9 percent). If we had not been, Mitterrand would have won. Don't forget that he was only 344,400 votes short..." But for 1981 they apparently have no stomach for it and this September we saw Giscard squarely beaten by Mitterrand, "not by Rocard," they curiously add. Yet the opinion polls continue to say the opposite. Just this week, Publi S.A., polling for PARIS-MATCH, claimed that Mitterrand will be beaten by Giscard (42 to 58 percent on the second ballot), while Rocard and Giscard should be tied (50 percent each). But these Gaullists do not believe these figures. They in fact have a totally different view of the evolution of their own political family.

One of them offers this example: "One of our top union secretaries, an official of one of the biggest unions, told us this morning that practically not a single one of his 6,000 members (sic) would today vote for Giscard on the first ballot. On the second ballot, almost all of them would still prefer to vote for Mitterrand. As for ordinary Gaullist voters, they are divided among three more or less equal thirds: abstentions, for Giscard, for Mitterrand."

Chirac's Defeat

But can we be so sure of this? Will not the conservative reflex Sanguinetti speaks of, in the end, sweep away hesitations and disillusionments?

What is, however, discernible is the dissatisfaction of a large segment of the moderate public, which has always served as a runoff for the Gaullist movement. This was obvious on the evening of 13 September in that theater auditorium in Amboise, where Michel Debre, the mayor of the town, again met with from 600 to 700 "friends from Amboise and Tours," as he refers to them, on the occasion of his very first election meeting. Present were PME [expansion unknown] members, small businessmen, winegrowers, a few teachers, a canon. A not very young audience. The trial conducted by Debre, without too much passion, was harsh: "The state is hesitant. This is a great weakness... The government's statements are unreal, as are those of the opposition... The renunciation of France as a nation... There is no longer any of the authority of the government of the republic..." etc. The audience

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approved, putting on a good show. But there was much more enthusiasm when Debre spoke of the excessive burden of social welfare on wages or when he appealed to nationalist sentiment. It is hard to imagine people like these voting for Mitterrand, even to punish a Giscard who has disappointed them!

"It wasn't the RPR's [Rally for the Republic] real customers whom you saw at Amboise," retort Chirac's followers, who cling more than ever to the notion of a "people's Gaullism," which still survives and is perhaps closer to a socialism "disengaged" from the Left Union than a not very "social" Giscardism.

But on this point it is hard to distinguish basic arguments from personal quarrels and the accusations involved. Obviously, Jacques Chirac had nourished the hope of being the sole Gaullist candidate. Very ambitious, he probably even imagined that, by running his campaign in his own way, bringing up his big guns, he could--perhaps--win second place on the first ballot, outdistance Mitterrand and thus get to oppose Giscard himself in the final balloting. Permit us to doubt the likelihood of this. But, at any rate, Michel Debre's entry in the race swept away this dream. As soon as the possibility of a split vote among Gaullist voters takes shape, the situation changes. Even if Chirac gets 12 percent of the vote and Debre 7 or 8 percent, despite the fact that the Gaullist total of 20 percent may be a respectable figure, public opinion will only remember that Chirac was defeated.

Nasty Comments

Hence the mayor of Paris' certainty: Michel Debre's candidacy could only be hoped for, perhaps even encouraged by the Elysee. It cannot, at any rate, attempt to prevent him from being a candidate.

We can, moreover, say that, given the present state of affairs, this objective appears to have been practically achieved. If there are no new developments, if the situation does not perceptibly change between now and the end of the year, Chirac will more and more be subjected to pressure from those in his camp who would talk him out of putting up a fight which, according to them, is hopeless and at the end of which he could only again declare his allegiance or run the risk of being accused of regicide (if, for example, he were to abstain from participating in the second ballot). True, opposing this, RPR members, confused by Debre's candidacy particularly because they see all those who have been excluded from the movement rallying about the mayor of Amboise and hear the encouragement--wellbalanced because Giscard must not be offended either--he has been receiving from Guichard, Chaban-Delmas or Peyrefitte, are beginning to show themselves. So, disoriented, the RPR "rank and file" would really like to know "what Chirac is going to do."

And Chirac is waiting or hoping for "the event" that might change the facts of the problem. But he is not the only one who is peering through the clouds. One has the impression that the entire class of politicians--non-Giscardian--is thus waiting for "something" to come and liberate it without its having to lift a finger.

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We sensed it again this week when the rumor was spread that LE CANARD ENCHAINE was about to reopen the affair of Bokassa and his diamonds. Would the shock be powerful enough this time to shake a public opinion that does not yet appear to have been affected by the scandal?

Seen in this light, the situation is not one to be particularly proud of. But that is the way it is. One has merely to cock an ear to realize that the bitter criticism of Giscard's politics which little by little has been developing in a good part of the majority party is accompanied by harsh judgments on Valery Giscard d'Estaing's Louis-Philippe-like behavior. Of course, no one would risk publicly voicing these accusations or nasty comments that do not go beyond the walls of respectable living rooms. But it will be suggested that the press "is not doing its job." In short, all respect has vanished and the time is perhaps near for palace conspiracies. In any event, there seem to be a fair number of people who feel that it is not impossible that, presumably convinced that his reelection was not absolutely certain, Giscard might give up the thought of running for a second 7-year term.

It is hard to distinguish the "poisonous" from the sincere among all this court gossip. Thus Pierre Juillet is still a master tactician, a disturbing behind-the-scenes man (who has also lost a few battles), but he is right in demanding that his former "pals" rid themselves of the "soporific" which he feels the government is now giving off. It was he who, after being asked to do so, entrusted his alter ego, Marie-France Garaud, with the task of questioning this "prince who governs us," whom they together had placed on the throne, at the Europe 1 "Press Club." Both of them find sentiments close to their own in speeches like Debre's. This annoys Chirac. Should Giscard, therefore, be automatically satisfied? At first blush perhaps: The embarrassment of an opponent is stimulating. But "Marie-France," as she is called, has actually adopted an opposing view and has furthermore chosen a sensitive area for the Gaullist movement as her battleground: international policy. As far as she and Juillet are concerned, it is evident that Giscard is only capable of facing up to the ordeals that threaten the world. This is no small accusation. But it is not an unworthy debate. Only a bit late in coming.

And so the crossfire continues. Last week, Irene Allier noted that, if Valery Giscard d'Estaing is reelected president in 1981, he will owe his victory largely to the "objective" support the PCF [French Communist Party] lends him by dividing the left.* We must today admit that, if, on the other hand, Giscard is beaten, he will owe his defeat to part of his own majority.

*See also Roger Priouret's analysis on p 49.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ELECTIONS: PCF, PS, UDF, RPR FACE 1981

Division in Four Camps

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 13-19 Sep pp 20-21

[Article by Irene Allier: "The Jumble of the Four"]

[Text] They are returning, they have returned. They are there. Francois Mitterrand on the "Press Club"; Georges Marchais, returning from Bulgaria with his prayer book "Hope at Hand," ushered in with great furor by the PCF Politbureau; Jacques Chirac, who will be heard on 12 October on Europe 1 and afterwards on "Cards on the Table"; Giscard d'Estaing, ubiquitous, of course; and then the latest one, Michel Debre, who in announcing his candidacy, created a ridiculous situation in the RPR [Rally for the Republic]. (Mitterrand [cannot identify]), but makes a certain impression with his performance on "Cards on the Table."

It is indeed the return and, at first sight, it only differs from the preceding ones, because it will end in the presidential election. Meanwhile the "big" four are continuing to outdo each other in perverseness, by delaying maliciously the moment when they will call on us to vote for them. On 9 September, Georges Marchais, on the occasion of the personal eulogy of his book, claimed to know nothing about the candidate which his party's national conference will select on 12 October. The day before Francois Mitterrand, who asserted he knew everything about the socialist candidate, but did not want to say anything, declared that the process of PS [Socialist Party] selection would begin on 19 October, but only for the candidates "in trouble" among whom, he obviously was not included. Jacques Chirac has returned from his vacation and has decided not to make any decision until December or even next January. As for Giscard d'Estaing, everyone knows that he will announce his candidacy after everyone else, at the moment he considers the most belatedly appropriate. Thus they

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occupy the stage without fearing, it seems, seeing the weary spectators leave the room.

But that is only the appearance. Behind the scenes, one can discern in the distance the features of odd, futile moves, of devious maneuvers, as exciting as a game of puss in the corner. The fact is that the situation has changed and the old hands there are walking on tiptoes. Ah! how simple political life was when France was divided in two! Left, right, left, right, each one marched with his group, spending its time with varying success in the defeat of the other. Alas! the breakup of the left first, the collapse of the majority afterwards, have changed all that. France is divided into four parts, everyone will tell you that and these separated quarters, from now on as unstable as mercury balls, are trying to reorganize combinations likely to assure their future.

The "Antichange Team"

On the communist side, things are still relatively simple. It was 3 years ago that the PCF resigned itself to its loss of power and its only objective is to continue its existence, as it were to make amends for this result of its newly found isolation and its impotence. It destroyed the Left alliance by attacking the PS, so that the very idea of a coalition government loses all credibility. It is not attempting to restore it. The only union which it earnestly desires today, no longer involves a compromise on a "progressive democracy" or a program of transition to socialism. It implies unconditional support of its own immediate "revolutionary" objectives, radical changes in political, economic and social relations gained one by one, through present social struggles.

An example: it is no longer a question of discussing the number of nationalizations since "every large enterprise is destined to be nationalized," ("Hope at Hand"). Since it feared driving away enough voters already frightened by the idea of a "revolution," which they do not want and whose features are not even described for them, the PCF stubbornly rests on the "overall positive achievements" of existing socialism. After Afghanistan, after Poland! Certainly, Georges Marchais describes the future communist candidate as an "anti-Giscard." In fact, he does not spare the president. But, actually, the communist strategy is "objectively," as he would say, the strongest support of the president. Whether he wants it or not, the PCF wants to prevent a Mitterrand or a Rocard from winning the presidency at all costs and it firmly supports Giscard. "The socialist party faces the antichange

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team, the Giscard-Marchais team," Mitterrand declared on the "Press Club" of 8 September, not, however, without repeating his hope of a radical change in communist strategy proof against events. Meanwhile, it is not unusual that this PCF stubbornness leads the other players to reconsider their bets.

Through an obviously simplifying concern for proportion, viewing the strategy of the Giscard-Marchais matter, one could create in some people the impression of a RPR-PS strategy. Illusions? Certainly, this policy does not have--or not yet--the endorsement of Chirac or of the majority of his general staff. It is no less true that at the time when the PS has an eye on a Gaullist electorate, supposedly without heirs, we find at rue de Lille national RPR leaders, who consider aiding the election of a socialist to the presidency, rather than seeing Giscard return there for 7 years.

The reasoning on the part of the noncommunist left is simple: the 1974 presidential election took place within the scope of centrism. These centrists being won over by Giscard from now on, the 1981 election will take place within the limits of a Gaullism abused by him. This is why, we no longer hear radical or socialist frontal attacks against Chirac and his friends. This extends from Michel Crepeau, president of the MRG [Movement of Leftist Radicals] who discovers "a genuine progressive trend" in the RPR and congratulates himself on sharing with it the "primacy given to national independence" (6 September on France-Inter) to the rather benevolent silences of Mitterrand (8 September on Europe 1): not a word against Chirac, a bow to Debre, "who played an important role in history," and a small significant phrase: "I feel an affinity with whoever will want [...] to save us from political leaders who do such a bad job at the head of the state and in the government." And again: We take our honey wherever we find it."

There is certainly something there to annoy even more those socialists who do not share his views. But what! In the appeal to the Gaullists, the PCF was ahead of Mitterrand by several lengths. However, the PCF alone is united and Marchais is its prophet. On the other hand, in the PS, which is naturally divided, one is annoyed more easily. All the more so, since at this time, an additional irritation fuels the underlying tension. Why did Mitterrand act so cunning with his friends? Since he knows, he, who will be the socialist candidate for the presidency, since he has made his choice and he has said so, why not make it public and allow the PS to begin a campaign, which in any case, will not be easy?

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Nevertheless, it is in the RPR where the least restrained confusion prevails. The candidacy of Michel Debre plunged the movement into an atmosphere of feverish bewilderment, from which Chirac's silences do not help it to extricate itself. The storm has blown over the contemplations of the general staff and scattered to the four winds the conclusions of Chirac's closest advisers: one of the most outstanding is explicit: "He should not be a candidate. He has everything to lose in it, especially now that Debre has announced. The RPR would be divided. Chirac will turn in a mediocre performance, the deputies will have a lot of trouble and will rush to Giscard. If Debre appears to turn in a passable performance in December, Chirac will only have to help without involving himself fully. Thus he preserves all his chances for 1988. Being the mayor of Paris, he is not out of the political arena, for I am sure that he will be reelected mayor."

A Secret Lunch

Meanwhile, a member of parliament defends the opposite position: "Chirac must run without considering the Debre incident. The latter will never get all the Gaullist votes. He will only lead astray those left for account of our movement. If our electorate is not allowed to vote for Chirac, it will be dispersed and God knows what will happen. Chirac cannot make the PS's bed. He has an historic responsibility. All the more so, since in the presidential election, no one is beaten. Only the votes count. It is necessary to win percentages to exist and only Chirac can bring us the best. If he does not run, I am going fishing."

At the national center in rue de Lille there are those who speak quite differently: "everybody sees Giscard elected, not I, says a member of the general staff. Eight months before election, the polls give him between 35 and 37 percent of the votes on the first round with 51 percent of the voters still undecided. In 1965, 8 months before the election, the polls gave 56 percent to de Gaulle, who only had 44 percent the day of the first round. With an erosion less than that of the general, Giscard cannot reach 30 percent, which risks preventing him from passing the barrier of the second round. In addition, the Left alliance having broken up, there can be a new dynamics in the socialist vote: with the communist danger gone, a number of the voters will want to give a lesson to the outgoing president."

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Now, on that side, one will not attempt to fly to the assistance of the outgoing president. One says clearly, "rather a socialist than Giscard, since, having gotten rid of the communists, the socialists have become valuable spokesmen." In short, in that corner of rue de Lille, one could easily accept seeing part of the RPR electorate help the "rehabilitated" socialist candidate, provided the PS election campaign demonstrates this rehabilitation.

It is indeed on that side that we find Jean Lipkowski, a former Gaullist of the left. RPR deputy from Charente-Maritime, who never lost hope of reconciling with the socialists the "social trend" which he always thought he saw running through Gaullism. It is to his persistence that we would have owed the unique conversation which was to have brought together in early July, at his table in rue de Bac, two unusual guests: Jacques Chirac and Francois Mitterrand. Chirac rejected the interview without succeeding in convincing persons close to him; Mitterrand did not say a word about it to anyone.

The matter is no less probable. "Lip" has always preserved with his political "dreams," the friendships of his youth: Mitterrand first, whom he knew for a long time and Edith Cresson, socialist deputy to the European Assembly, among others. It was, moreover, at Strasbourg where Chirac discovered the socialists, beginning with the most forceful opponent for mayor of Paris: Georges Sarre. About a year ago, the RPR leader declared in private, on the occasion of opinions which were infinitely more varied than in public, that he even recognized in Mitterrand some qualities of a statesman... But there is room to surmise from that whether he will open up the way for him.

In fact, the only problem for the RPR is to survive the presidential elections. For the means available to Chirac are not very sure from now on. So uncertain even, that the leadership of the movement has just determined the party's number one objective beyond the presidential election as the legislative elections, for which the order for general mobilization will come out of rue de Lille beginning this week.

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Each Party's Present Status

Paris LE FIGARO in French 15 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Xavier Marchetti: "The Battle of the Second Round
Already"]

[Text] The presidential elections are 7 months away. It is time for large scale election maneuvers. In the majority as well as in the opposition, the political leaders only speak of the 1981 term.

Michel Debre begins his tour of France as a candidate at Amboise. Jacques Chaban-Delmas points out the need to organize an "active majority" at Nice.

It is especially Georges Marchais and Francois Mitterrand who, playing leap frog above the campaign and the first round of voting, are already discussing possible agreements for the second round.

On "HUMANITE's" anniversary, the secretary general of the communist party announced, willingly or not, his candidacy a month ahead of the scheduled date: "I am the only anti-Giscard candidate." But he especially revealed himself once again as the special opponent of the socialist party. His attack against Francois Mitterrand developed in two stages. First, "there is not the shadow of a doubt that Francois Mitterrand will have the same policy as Giscard." Then, "change is not only installing a new occupant in the Elysee."

Although he is not "bothered about Georges Marchais' antisocialist attacks," the first secretary of the socialist party has immediately answered to emphasize that the communist leader "is playing the power game" and especially to warn: "One does

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not negotiate between two rounds. The socialist party will not negotiate with a knife at its throat."

We are beginning the last 200 days of the 7 year term. The race has not started yet, but the political beginning is very obvious. At the center of all considerations, in the secrecy of all hidden motives, at the start of all tactical plans, a single thing predominates: the presidential election.

On top of that, two things are going to happen which will not change anything: the senatorial elections and the budgetary session (the last of the 7 year term). The first will not favor the majority. The second could, on the contrary, without leading to reconciliation, not reveal too harsh disagreements.

On the other hand, trade union activity, with the aggressive efforts of a CGT which already tends completely toward violent demands, has a good chance of characterizing the fall and winter. The PCF will no doubt be the only one to gain by it and it is obvious that it will support and guarantee every disturbance, calculated or accidental, of the social atmosphere.

Before this confusion announced with a minimum of risk of error by Raymond Barre, where are the big political parties?

It is first necessary to consider the enormous advantage of the outgoing president. Strong in his investiture, he is the focal point of the entire proceedings. The more he remains quiet and evasive about his intentions, the more perplexity and inordinate concern he creates among all the others.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing has indicated for a long time that he would only answer the question whether he will run or not in due time. A step reminiscent of that of De Gaulle, who, like him, was in the position of outgoing president (the voting was on 5 December and the general only announced his candidacy on 4 November).

A higher reason explains such an attitude: as long as he is not a candidate, the outgoing person remains president in the fullness of his authority and continues to be above all the political campaign. The actual absence of national legitimacy is thus avoided.

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A secondary but obvious reason also exists. It is tactical. The president, who has reached the end of his mandate, has alone three trumps. He can resign, but only do it at the last minute. He can resign and show a clear preference for a possible successor. He can stand for election, but only announce very late.

None of his potential adversaries have such weapons. Each one must stick to an assumption and make his calculations in time--with the risk of being very much mistaken about the final choice, which the outgoing president would make. All are forced to think and act like a bet on heads or tails.

However, all have already made this bet: Valery Giscard d'Estaing will run again. And no one takes seriously, under the circumstances, the use of the conditional, which his supporters, who claim to be closest to him, indulge in here or there. These affectations, it is true, do not confuse anyone.

Starting from that, how is the campaign organized?

For the communist party, everything is clear. It will go into battle on its own account and will run Georges Marchais. It has repudiated the formula of the single candidacy of the left which was retained in 1965 and 1974. It has given up the idea of electing a socialist. One has regained the fortified camp, one digs in and one will only come out with the banner raised high.

There is a single imperative: increase its numbers.

There is a double watchword for this purpose. The first is to regain the authenticity of the "only worker party." This will bring us, thru the interposed CGT, an increase of conflicts and strikes and as a short time ago, a continuous hammering out of eternal slogans. Then it is necessary to recover a political virginity of the left, which, if necessary, would involve the order of abstaining from the second round. Which in giving credibility (but what does it matter) to the idea of a PCF, "an objective ally" of the outgoing president, would start up again the interpretations (but what does it matter, again) of the "hand of Moscow" in the French election. The constant indictment of Francois Mitterrand, who has gone over to Atlanticism and is an accomplice of the forces of the right, seems to correspond to a calculation of this type. Between Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the PS candidate remaining alone in the lists for the final voting, the PCF could well say as in 1969: "They are both the same." The watchword to abstain would then come of itself, again.

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PS: Hot and Cold

Nothing will be clear in the SP as long as its candidate is not selected. Francois Mitterrand seems to discreetly blow hot and cold; now being inclined towards the candidacy, now seeming to see for other occasions this "socialist victory" which has not ceased to be denied him.

He seems to have a Florentine cunning--the man is as secretive as he is determined. But perhaps there is also a profound questioning, or the fear of a "third defeat" would be a consideration, especially as a consequence for the future of the party, reorganized by dint of personal stubbornness. Actually everything will not stop in May 1981. When the presidential election is over, other municipal and legislative elections will follow, other competitions where to preserve local power (two-thirds of the towns of more than 30,000 inhabitants) and maintain its parliamentary influence, the left will find itself again in one way or another. Failing to achieve supreme political power--the Elysee--political vision can concentrate on maintaining a powerful PS. Having avoided the presidential failure, Francois Mitterrand, especially if he lets Michel Rocard suffer this blow, would be the only one able to keep the PS in first place.

The first opportunity for Michel Rocard to be a candidate, would be in Francois Mitterrand's longer term choice. But, for the moment, he only seems to have the advantage in the polls which are somewhat premature and the socialist uncertainty continues.

The strategists of the majority linger behind gladly. From day to day, more of them seem to consider Francois Mitterrand as a more formidable adversary than Michel Rocard. There are even some of the more clairvoyant who predict a decisive contribution of communist votes for Francois Mitterrand, if his count in the first round is convincing enough to counteract a PCF order to abstain and Valery Giscard d'Estaing himself has never hidden the fact that he always considered his 1974 rival as his most dangerous challenger in 1981.

UDF /French Democratic Union/: Two are More Than One

The party which claims Valery Giscard d'Estaing has obviously succeeded less well than the president. It could not exist long without him. He is its reason for being and acting. The unconditional support of its actual chief both limits and

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indicates its motives for action. It waits, with its weapons at its feet, knowing that the state apparatus has been secured for it.

What is noticed there, outside of a genuine desire to be involved, is the confusion created by the candidacy of Michel Debre. Seen at first a divisive element in the "Gaullist camp" then tolerated as a factor for "improving discussion," it is disturbing because it risks producing a "warning vote" on the first round: a shift of votes, which would not all return to the outgoing president in the second round. Added to it, is the unknown Chirac. Moreover, two "Gaullist" candidates can "cover more ground" than a single one--and consequently weaken the presidential electorate as much, thus making more difficult a rise above the barrier of 50 percent of the second ballot.

RPR = Merely players?

Michel Debre, declared a candidate, obviously concerns the Gaullist camp. Jacques Chirac, repeating his conviction that Gaullist unity will take place, intrigues more than he allays fears. Like Francois Mitterrand, he will only announce his candidacy as late as possible, but like him, he will have to face an internal discussion. Knowing how many RPR voters (24 percent in the parliamentary elections in 1978) would refuse to vote for Giscard d'Estaing in the first round is a question. The estimates naturally vary. Another question is knowing how many of the latter would also deny their vote in the second round. And there is the wretched business.

The answer to the first question would determine deciding on or abandoning a Chirac candidacy. The answer to the second question can determine the final result of the presidential election. And if it is the voters who gave it, the accident, if there is an accident, would be irreparable.

For the Gaullists, that is sufficient to explain that nothing is yet settled. Their interest is to prove their strength, to influence the election--barring admitting that they are only players on the way to extinction. Their conscience prevents them from overthrowing the government which they have built, rather than taking back a president who is not one of them. It is a formidable discussion, which has lasted since 1976.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CHANGES IN GEOGRAPHIC SUPPORT FOR PCF, PSF COMPARED

PCF-PSF Duel

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 11-17 Oct 80 pp 133-134

[Article by Emmanuel Todd]

[Text] The 1978 legislative elections marked the end of an age-old balance. The PSF [French Socialist Party] succeeded in implanting itself nationally, while the PCF [French Communist Party] is withdrawing to its bastions.

The 1978 legislative elections did not leave the memory of a glorious event. No overall change for the country resulted from it. The socialists were disappointed; the Communists and the parties of the majority were relieved by the unexpected stability of the political system. The PS, in spite of a 4 percent increase in votes, won only nine districts. The PC, in spite of a small loss in the number of its votes--from 21.3 to 20.5 percent--apparently and miraculously took 16 additional seats. The majority contented itself with remaining the majority, as has been the custom in France since the beginning of the Fifth Republic. From the viewpoint of the party staffs nothing, therefore, changed.

Such is not the case with electoral sociology. An indepth analysis of French political geography reveals that the 1978 election was a major watershed in the country's history. It marked the shattering of an age-old balance, the disruption of a regional distribution of political forces whose establishment dates back to the beginnings of the Third Republic; i.e., the end of the 19th century.

Variance and Synthesis

From the beginning, the French political system has only been superficially national. The balanced face-off of the left and right hardly exists except in the parliamentary hemicycle in the Palais-Bourbon. Most of the provinces and regions in reality have been politically homogeneous and stable since 1880. The right traditionally wins in the West, in a large part of the East and in the southern part of the Massif Central. The left dominates in the South, Limousin and its surrounding area and in the North. The outcome of the election battle is only uncertain in the fringes of these inert blocs in which the vote, whether heavily from the left or massively from the right, is not a subject for reflection on the part of individuals but an element of local culture, as stable as food or clothing habits.

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Statistically, this characteristic of the political system is expressed by an extreme inequality of the results obtained by each party in the different regions of France. In the 1919 elections, for example, on the eve of the Tours scission, the old Socialist Party, still united, received 42 percent of the votes cast in Allier, but only 3 percent in Vendee; 40 percent in Bouches-du-Rhone, but 7 percent in Orne; 22 percent in Correze, but 5 percent in Meuse. A common statistical indicator, variance, an evocative term, permits the synthesis of these differences for all departments, the measurement of the average rate of inequality of the results obtained by such and such party in a given election. The variance--which here sums up the geographic variability of electoral performances--is traditionally sizable for all French political parties. The more a party tends to have a uniform distribution of its voters throughout the territory the smaller its variance will be. On the contrary, the more its voters are concentrated in certain bastions, and fragmentary in other regions, the larger the variance will be.

From this standpoint, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party in 1973 still appeared as two parties of the old kind. These two brothers, not twins but both born of the old Jaures Socialist Party, reflect, as did their common ancestor, sizable variances in their electoral results: 46 for the PS, 46 for the PC. This symmetrical system was shattered in 1978: the electoral variance of the PC did not change; that of the PS fell to 23.

This drop indicates that the Socialist Party abruptly is covering all French territory. It is advancing particularly in the traditional strongholds of the right, the East and the West. It is regressing in the right's old regions of establishment, in the South particularly (see maps 3 and 4).

Socialist penetration in the East--which represents a gain of 8 percent votes in Alsace--is basically a natural phenomenon. The very conservative bias of this region is recent, the effect of 19th century traumatism, the unceasing transfers of sovereignty experienced by Alsace-Lorraine since 1870. In the middle of the 19th century, Alsace was considered a republican region and of the left. It was the anticlerical policy of the Third Republic, between the two wars, which led the recovered province to reject its traditions of the left.

Therefore, the socialist thrust is not something new but a reconciliation.

It is the conquest of the West by the PS, initiated in 1978, which is the spectacular and fundamental phenomenon. Here, socialism is penetrating a region which has rejected the left, with a certain amount of fanaticism, since 1789. In 1913, Andre Siegfried had shown quite well in his "Political Table of Western France" the extent to which Brittany and above all Anjou, Maine and Vendee were still living by the clock of the Ancien Regime, as if they were outside republican France. The 1978 election, therefore, ended a historical cycle. The election meant that the French Revolution, with its specific ideological conflicts, with its loves and its hates, was ended. It was time.

From that point on, a party of the left has existed which is accepted by all the regions of France. The Socialist Party, which has had a great deal of difficulty in defining a precise program, nonetheless unquestionably personifies a new national sensibility.

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The PS, which is neither the advocate of a planned economy [dirigiste], nor liberal, nor anticlerical, which is incapable of choosing between the ecology and nuclear power and which is placid on the subject of customs, is really defined by its hesitations. It is a party of goodwill which is not seeking conflict out of principle. Therein is its importance and, paradoxically, its solidity.

The PC hopes for the collapse of this soft, divided organization which is not structured by ideology. But it is doubtful that the present PS, whose electoral distribution reveals that it is the product of a profound mutation, will disappear from one day to the next.

Provincial Setbacks

In the face of this movement of national scope, the French Communist Party personifies loyalty to regional traditions. It remains solidly established, or sadly withdrawn, according to the point of view, in its bastions in the North, Limousin and the South. It is absolutely unable to extend itself to the Eastern and Western parts of the country. On the contrary: in 1978 (see map 2), its most serious provincial setbacks were produced in regions where it was already traditionally weak. It lost more than 4 percent of the votes cast in Finistere, Calvados and Cantal, departments which all belong to the bloc of the old, conservative regions. With its strongholds in the North, Center and South, the PCF's electoral map, with its extreme contrasts, still somewhat resembles that of French socialism in 1919. It is the exact opposite of the right's map. The Communist Party, like the PS, has been unable to overcome the cadres and loyalties defined by our very old revolution.

The only region in which the PC is still advancing in a noteworthy fashion is typically the Southwest (Hautes-Pyrenees, Ariege, Tarn-et-Garonne, Haute-Garonne) where it tirelessly continues to nibble away at the bastions of the old SFIO [French Section of the Workers Internationalist] and of the Radical Party (see map 3). French communism in this manner is confirming that it is less a force of the left than a necrosis of the left, stricken by impotence when it comes to causing the conservative influence to draw back.


National Sensibility

There is one region in France, the capital, that is the place to say so, where the Communist Party is collapsing: the Parisian metropolitan area, broadly speaking. In all the departments of the small circle (Paris, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-d'Oise, Hauts-de-Seine), the PCF, between 1973 and 1978, fell from 29.5 to 24.9 percent of the votes cast. A drop of 4.6 percent in 5 years.

From the beginning, the strength of Parisian communism masked the inequalities of the Party's distribution in the totality of French territory. In the great Jacobin tradition, it was enough for the PC to be strong in the capital to be considered a great national party. This central collapse, if it continues, which is probable, threatens to cause the brutal appearance of the regional, folkloric characteristics of the French Communist Party.

It is strange to note that at the very moment when its Politburo is once again turning toward Moscow, noisily reactivating the internationalist side of the PCF,

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Key:

The Contraction

These three maps, for the legislative elections of 1956, 1973 and 1978, indicate the departments in which communist votes are more numerous than socialist votes. The submersion of the PC by the PS is advancing from the periphery toward the center. The last zones of strength of the PC continue to be spread along a strange central axis.

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- the electorate itself is falling back to its provincial bases. In the coming years, the French Communist Party is in danger of finding itself shredded by these two contrary movements, which have the common objective, however, of moving the PCF away from any really "national" sensibility.

- In 1980, it is not enough to be powerful in Limoges and Moscow to continue to count in the French political system.

PC-PS Trends


Paris L'EXPRESS in French 11-17 Oct 80 p 135

[Text] Comparison of maps 2 and 4 shows that in March 1978 the PC distribution was very spotty--three bastions in the North, Center and South; large gaps in the East and West--while the distribution of the PS has become nearly uniform over the entire national territory.

Comparison of maps 1 and 2 indicates that, except for the Northeast, the 1980 communist zones of strength still largely correspond to the 1919 socialist zones of strength, before the Congress of Tours scission.

- Map 3 shows local evolutions contrary to the national trends registered in 1978. The Socialist Party, which is advancing nationally, is losing ground in its bastions in the South and Limousin. The Communist Party is advancing in the Toulouse-Pyrenees region.

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[Key on following page]

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Key:

- Map 1: Legislative elections of 1919: percentage of socialist voters (compared to votes cast) during the first round of balloting.
- Map 2: Legislative elections of March 1978: percentage of communist voters (compared to votes cast) during the first round of balloting.
- Map 3: [white box] Departments in which the PC received over 3 percent.
[shaded box] Departments in which the PS lost over 1 percent.
- Legislative elections of March 1978: departments in which the PC made the greatest advances and those in which the PS lost the most ground.
- Map 4: 0 to 15% [also for maps 1 & 2]
15 to 20%
20 to 25%
25% and over
- Legislative elections of March 1978: percentage of socialist voters (compared to total votes cast) during the first round of balloting.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BARAK DISCUSSES PCF'S MEMBERSHIP LOSS

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 3 Oct 80 p 41

[Interview with Michel Barak, member of the PCF]

[Text] Two years ago you had an article in LE MONDE, contesting the party's official analysis of the defeat of the left. Since then, nothing. Today you explain the PCF's (French Communist Party) faults in a book, and you grant an interview. Why?

[Answer] Isn't Marchais presenting views on fundamental points, through television, without ever having consulted the membership?

[Question] Are you still a member of the PCF?

[Answer] Yes, I just received confirmation of this after 6 months of fruitless efforts. I had to send a certified letter to the first secretary of Bouches-du-Rhone (Marsailles) in order to get my party identification card.

[Question] Do you mean to suggest that, more and more, the heirarchy decides for the people?

[Answer] Absolutely. Moreover, political cells--which used to feed on democratic debates--today are reduced to activities which I characterize as mindless mimicry.

This is not new in the PC.

The novelty is that nobody is convinced, and from this fact springs the unprecedented conflict within the PCF. Party managers pound on us a truth thought out by the leadership: A sectarian line of conduct, without any worker-oriented perspectives. This means that all workers who want to discuss these truths are blackmarked and called "intellectuals."

[Question] What's going on in your cell?

[Answer] First of all a decrease in membership. Two-thirds of the members, workers and intellectuals, left with anger and very depressed. We were about 30; now only 10 are left. Moreover, our cell no longer meets.

[Question] Are there many in the same situation?

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[Answer] I have friends just about everywhere in France and I can assure you that many district cells--in Aix, Nice, Prades, Lille, Paris and the suburbs--do not have any real activity, contrary to Roland Leroy's ridiculous statement that "the party cells have never had as much activity as during the summer of 1980."

[Question] What are the grievances against the Central Committee?

[Answer] It turned its back on the policies of overture and alliance, while still referring to the 22d Congress. It imposed an unconditional alignment with the USSR on such subjects as the invasion of Afghanistan. It offered the struggle against the PS (Socialist Party) as its sole political perspective.

[Question] From an intellectual standpoint, how do you view Marchais' comments on television?

[Answer] Pathetic. He is still viewed as a spokesman for workers demands by some, but I notice that for many others his TV appearances are viewed as a comedy show: He is becoming funnier and funnier. I have some friends who switch channels when he is on: "Enough of this circus!"

[Question] Why do you stay in the PCF?

[Answer] I am not alone. Many who are in disagreement with the PCF's present policies have stayed and want to change the party before the advent of the gulags.

In Marseilles they tried to say I was crazy, but I am still here and sane. We are going to organize a committee to lead a united battle, bring about a leftwing victory and eventually fight against voting directives given secretly during the last legislative elections by factory managers.

[Question] Then it would almost be good if Marchais took a "dive" in 1981, so that the present leadership could be renewed?

[Answer] I hope that many members will rejoin the cells to continue to fight for unity and freedom. But let me read you a letter from a militant: "I hope that Marchais does not score 15 percent in the first round, that would permit a new start and the party's regeneration."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MARCHAIS VULNERABLE AS PCF DISSIDENTS, CRITICS SPEAK OUT

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 20 Oct 80 pp 35-36

[Article by Hubert Chavelet: "Marchais' Battle Stakes"]

[Text] Mr Marchais might be staking his position as general secretary in the presidential election. Just as, in Paris, Mr Fiszbin paid the price for his defeat in the parliamentary elections.

A unanimous 1,300 votes nominated Mr Georges Marchais for candidate to the Elysée at the close of the national conference of the Communist Party. However, beneath this unanimity, there are deep faults within the party itself. The dissidents have not said their last word and the big shots in the apparatus have warned the general secretary against untimely initiatives.

Mr Marchais, therefore, has no choice. He said it openly on Antenne 2, on 13 October: to him, the "capital question" is to gather "as many votes as possible." "A fundamental question," he added. As a matter of fact, it is.

To the socialists, Mr Marchais said:

"Systematic withdrawal in favor of the leftist candidate having obtained the more votes has now become an outdated formula."

In the Antenne 2 studio, a communist party member approved:

"He is right; if it means replacing Giscard by Rocard, it is not worth it."

This summarizes the whole debate.

The next day, the socialists reacted to what Mr Jean Elleinstein, a dissident party intellectual, called "the corpse of the union of the left which lies in Georges Marchais' desk drawer, Place Colonel Fabien." Mr Laurent Fabius, spokesman for Mr Mitterrand, summarized his party's views:

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"Mr Marchais is not the anti-Giscard candidate. He is the antihope candidate. He is working for Giscard."

Within the Communist Party itself, party members have reacted immediately to the official announcement of the general secretary's candidacy. Mrs Yvonne Quiles, former editor of FRANCE NOUVELLE, denounced the "return to the cult of personality." Mr Kehayan, joint author with his wife of the book "Rue du Proletaire Rouge" evoked "the end-of-year examinations of Candidate Georges Marchais by the Kremlin vice-principals," and Mr Antoine Spire, former manager of Editions Sociales, indicated:

"We have not been able to debate in a normal and democratic manner the orientations of Candidate Georges Marchais' campaign."

The day before this national conference, Mr Henri Fiszbin, former secretary of the Paris federation and still a communist party member, had set the tone in an article published in LE MONDE. His argument revolved around two ideas:

1. The debate within the party has not been democratic.
2. The end of the union of the left is the end of any alternate policy for France.

Mr Fiszbin is not just another grassroots party member. He was the candidate of the Communist Party in the municipal elections of March 1977 in Paris, when the union of the left won 10 seats, a majority of them going to the communists. With not quite 3,000 more voices, he could have taken what is now Mr Chirac's position. The party did not forgive him for his failure in the parliamentary election the following year. They used him as a scapegoat.

Today, he is not isolated. He still has reliable supporters within his federation: Messrs Gager, Reau, Ferignac who are still members of the central committee.

Mr Fiszbin's interpellation to the communist leadership, whom he accuses of being "on the wrong track," has received no answer from the party apparatus. He has not been allowed to speak at the national conference as he had requested; however, his interpellation joins two currents which have just come to expression.

First, what had been improperly called the revolt of communist party intellectuals in 1978. Following an initiative by Mr Michel Barak, secretary of the Jacques-Duclos cell in Aix-Marseilles--where he teaches at the university--300 communists, soon joined by several hundred more, signed a petition which was published. After the disastrous defeat of the opposition in the parliamentary elections, due to the breaking off of the union of the left, they expressed their "surprise at a number of formulas and statements contained in Mr Marchais' declarations." Mr Michel Barak recalls this episode in the party life in his book: "Fractures au PCF."

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then appeared what has been termed "a call to the hundred." A motion jointly signed first by hundreds, then by thousands (they now claim to number 100,000) party members of the communist and socialist parties, calling for "union in the struggles." This initiative, taken last December by Messrs Bois (communist party) and Farandjis (socialist party) is still gathering signatures.

"I have heard comrades who otherwise agreed with the party line, pugnacious workers, ask questions to the federal committee concerning candidacy withdrawal. This shows that this call has come at the right time," one of those who signed it remarked.

While it is showing ostentatious serenity, the Communist Party is troubled by this internal contestation. With economy as a pretext, the number of political bureau members at the Paris federation has been reduced. This was done first at the expense of Mr Fiszbin's friends. Mr Barak has had difficulties getting his party card renewed. Several "contaminated" cells have been reorganized.

Mr Marchais thought it necessary to devote a long chapter of his book, "L'Espoir au Present" [Hope in the Present Tense], to the dissidents. "At the communist party," he wrote, "doors open both ways."

To prevent the "murmuring of a few" to sound like the "din of an army," the political bureau, in its internal guidelines, reminded party members that: "The creation of currents within the PCF is a mode of operation detrimental to our party's interest because it is contrary to the blossoming out of a truly democratic way of life."

Mr Georges Sarre, Paris municipal councilor, and one of the socialists who know best the communist party, remarked:

"There can be no minority group among communists. Otherwise, it would mean that the party has renounced democratic centralism and, therefore, has ceased to exist. However, there certainly is an ideological debate taking place within it today."

On the one hand, the dissidents whom one is trying to silence; on the other hand, the apparatchiks.

In an interview with LE MONDE, on 10 October, Mr Robert Ballanger, president of the communist group in the National Assembly, denounced simultaneously the policy of union, the socialists with Atlantic leanings for whom he is not going to vote on the second turn of the presidential election, and the cult of personality.

One of the dissidents notes:

"There is no doubt but that this is a warning to Georges Marchais who has been the instigator of the union of the left and is now renewing the tradition of the 'general secretary's party.'"

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Mr Fiterman, the number two of the communist party, has disavowed Mr Ballanger, and called his statements concerning the second turn "speculations worthy of barroom strategists."

Mr Marchais himself declared:

"Robert Ballanger has spoken like many others have done. He did not feel the need to come and see me."

And he added:

"Any consideration on the second turn is as yet inopportune."

Between the two diverging tendencies within the PCF, which are now under control, Mr Marchais can hope to remain in power only if he obtains "as many votes as possible." Failing which, the general secretary would become vulnerable.

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FRANCE

COUNTRY SECTION

AIGRAIN INTERVIEWED ON FUTURE OF RESEARCH

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Octo 80 pp 78, 83

[Interview with Pierre Aigrain, secretary of state for research, conducted by Gerard Bonnot: "In 5 Years We Will Have Caught Up With Germany..."]

[Text] [Question] The impression today is that France is not in the run in a number of scientific or technical research sectors.

[Answer] A medium power such as France cannot be strong in everything. What matters is to see to it that a gap in a particular area would not hinder the development of other areas where we could be strong. Consider toxicology. Unquestionably, countries such as the United States and even Great Britain are far advanced in the study of the action of pharmaceuticals on the body, what we know as clinical pharmacology. This lag will affect our entire pharmaceutical industry and, therefore, the future of medicine. It hinders the upsurge of our agro-food industry and even, to a certain extent, the overall development of our chemistry. We must catch up at all costs. Let me add that some gaps are not specific to our country. Consider the case of human nutrition which is one of our priorities for the future. The other day I was complaining to an American official that we had only one or two good teams who are already overloaded with work. He answered: "You know, it is the same in our country. We have only three or four teams and they too are overwhelmed with work."

[Question] When the French count their Nobel prizes, and when they see in the store the predominance of American, German or Japanese goods, they find it difficult to believe in the effectiveness of their researchers.

[Answer] As to the Nobel prizes, we must wait. You must not forget that the three Nobel prizes earned by France in the past few years were for work done long before the renovation of our scientific policy. As to technical applications, it is true that we are frequently beaten by foreigners, particularly by the Japanese, in the range of major consumer goods such as calculators, or electrical household goods. The French people are forced to notice this, since they buy and use them. Yet, when those same French people visit the United States and land on an airfield with the help of an unseen system built under French license he does not see this.

[Question] Whether we are dealing with clinical pharmacology, biology, or micro-processors, nevertheless, we have the impression that French research is behind in ideas, theories, or innovations.

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[Answer] Be they theoretical or practical, generally speaking, innovations are the result of a short circuit between two areas of knowledge so far considered as separate. What is bothering in France is not the quality of the people but the partitioning of research. I hasten to add that this tendency to erect barricades is not a specific fault of the researchers but of the French. We find this in politics, in economics, in all areas of public or private life. However, such partitioning, which is never a good thing, becomes catastrophic when it applies to research. We must at all costs eliminate barriers between agencies, subjects and laboratories, and between basic and applied research.

[Question] To listen to you talk, French science is like a good racing car which can never win a race because of a defective spark plug, brake pedal, or starter.

[Answer] What it needs, above all, is gasoline. After the period of the rich 1960s, when money was flowing, starting with 1970 we experienced a slowdown and even a regress in terms of absolute value. Happily, the situation has been stabilized since 1975. A special effort was even made to maintain the hiring rate. During that period the increase in personnel has been faster in France than, for example, in Germany whose research allocations have been increasing spectacularly. Therefore, we have preserved the main features and kept our car running. However, it has not been running at full power.

Unquestionably, all in all, today our laboratories are short of funds. That is why the 1981 budget calls for a 21 percent, in round figures, essentially for operational costs.

[Question] Is this enough?

[Answer] Obviously, in order for the French scientific system to become fully effective it takes more than for the government to agree to provide greater financing next year. I know that a great deal of work remains to be done, as much in the industrial as in the public sector. However, if the enterprises agree to make the same effort as the state, you would see that in 5 to 7 years we would be able to catch up with Germany. Let me remind you that this is the official target set by the president of the republic.

The effort which such catching up represents should not be underestimated. It is a question of allocating one-half of one percent more of our output to activities whose results will be felt only in the medium range. For the present, it would be a minor yet important sacrifice asked of the country. That is why the president of the republic has also decided that the government should issue a white paper to explain to the French that if research is adequate and properly done, we could resolve the major economic and social problems facing the nation today. Such a policy is possible, actually, only if this message is well received.

[Question] To be received, a message must be clear. The white paper message seems conflicting. On the one hand, it claims that research must remain free. On the other, that it must serve society.

[Answer] I do not believe that this is necessarily a contradiction. A researcher has his own motivations such as curiosity or the desire to compete. He would like to be the first to resolve one or another problem. This being said, we need

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financing and the motivations of the financing source do not have to be the same as those of the researcher. What matters is that both agree on the program to be implemented.

Do not forget that the transistor effect was discovered by a team whose main members were strictly in basic research. I have in mind, in particular, Bardeen, the only person to have been awarded twice the Nobel Prize in the same particular area--first for the transistor effect and, 15 years later, for his interpretation of superconductivity. This did not prevent him from working in a private laboratory, for the Bell Company, which had originated the program in the hope of benefiting from practical uses but which was able to present it to its researchers in such a way as to motivate them.

[Question] Science has no homeland. Whether it is a question of explaining the origin of the universe or of improving public transportation, would researchers, asked the same question, not led, necessarily, to suggest the same future development?

[Answer] At the very time we were drawing up our white paper, the Americans were engaged in exactly the same type of work. Comparing the two texts you would note differences of emphasis caused by the respective situations of the two countries. Take as an example energy and raw materials. The Americans emphasize far more than we do the problem of racial minorities while we pay far greater attention to the difficulties of the Third World. Yet, I will grant you that, all in all, at a given time, researchers in all countries more or less agree on the major lines of scientific and technical development.

[Question] Does this not create the risk that the entire world would like to accomplish the same thing at the same time? In such a program, what would the position of France be among the United States, Japan and Germany?

[Answer] Actually, we frequently made this error in the 1960s, and not in France only. I believe, however, that people are beginning to realize that such a competition is ruinous and, eventually, does not benefit anyone. Risks must be shared. Take the example of the Airbus. Both technically and, unquestionably, financially France could have carried out the project alone. However, some of our partners could have done equally well and if everyone had separately built his own Airbus no one would have recovered the costs, the market being too narrow for all these airplanes.

[Question] In order to complete all the projects listed in the white paper we would need 10 times, a hundred times more researchers than we have in France and even throughout the world. How does one choose?

[Answer] Obviously, something which the scientists themselves do not deny, the question of choices to be made and strategy to be adopted arises. As a general rule, I would say that the more it becomes a question of basic research projects the less choices one has. The ideal would be in all fields, for the results of such work then become indispensable in resolving a great variety of other more practical problems. Conversely, the closer we come to practical use and industrial development, the more it becomes necessary to be merciless. One must know how to

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specialize. France, for example, has given up the manufacturing of calculators even though it could do.

[Question] Practically speaking, do you believe that France should dedicate its resources mainly to maintaining its advance in areas where it is already strong or, conversely, to catch up in areas where it is behind?

[Answer] When a gap is discovered in a strategic sector such as toxicology, as I pointed out, nor is toxicology the only one, everything possible must be done to catch up at all costs. Conversely, when one is strong, one should try to remain strong for, in the final account, this is where the work is the easiest. One condition must be kept, however: The area must be promising. Look at the Americans, they were the strongest in big cars. They persisted in remaining the strongest and you can see what is happening today to their automobile industry. There are cases when one must have the courage to surrender when necessary a dominant position in order to plunge into new areas. One must choose well, however. I believe that it is in the interest of France to invest in scientific and technical sectors where it is still weak only if the others are weak as well. I mentioned to you the case of nutrition. In such a case, and only then, could France hope to become a leader some day.

[Question] In 1945 French science was dying. The fact that it is reviving today is the result of the will of a certain number of politicians who are thinking of the future.

[Answer] Certainly. There was Mendes France in 1954 and de Gaulle and his ministers after 1958.

[Question] Do you not fear that such a deliberately arbitrary action may be somewhat artificial? Something like the promotion of industrialization by Colbert in the 17th century. Today France has big laboratories and a large number of researchers who, on the basis of your white paper, could express their views on the future of the country. However, do you think that the country is ready to listen to them, divided between Frenchmen who continue to believe that the scientists should be left alone to work in their ivory towers and those who mistrust their lucubrations? In a word, are you certain that the grafting of science on the trunk of French society has taken?

[Answer] I acknowledge a great deal of truth in your rejoinder. Indeed, the French are poorly acquainted with their research and readily criticize it. For quite some time it was rejected by industry and the educational system. Yet, my impression is that things are changing. The teachers who train the young researchers are beginning to be concerned with their placement. The young researchers are beginning to find work in industry. Even the big technical enterprises are no longer recruiting exclusively their engineers from the big schools. I would say that we are progressing in a good direction and that, perhaps, we have covered some 15 percent of the way. The takeoff was the most difficult part.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

- PCF CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES--The PCF plans, unofficially, to spend 100 million francs on the presidential campaign. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 31 Oct 80 p 41]

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PUBLIC OPINION POLL SHOWS LOSS IN SUAREZ' ELECTORAL SUPPORT

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Sep 80 pp 29-31

[Text] With Adolfo Suarez collapsing, on the brink of a knockout, and his party demoralized after the Socialist parliamentary motion for censure, and the internal strife among the barons, plus what is still dragging on from the electoral defeats in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Andalusia, the first half of the year has been the hardest for the government.

When Metra Seis, an institute specializing in marketing, asked those queried at the request of CAMBIO 16 "whom would you vote for as president of the government?" only 12 percent replied Adolfo Suarez.

It was a response below the minimum, which a president of the government could hardly withstand. The hatchet blow of the censure motion influenced the opinion of the individuals who were interviewed. Suarez had not been liked in Parliament, during some sessions rebroadcast by radio and television throughout the country.

The 2,000 persons in the sample questioned in late June expressed their disappointment in President Suarez: Only 4 percent thought that the centrist leader had "improved," while 28 percent declared that he had "become worse."

But he could not be brought down. Then Suarez attempted to give some sign of reaction to his political credibility. "I have made mistakes," he told newsmen, and promised to end his voluntary isolation and talk to the press; because what is serious for him, as the poll disclosed, is the fact that his political rival, Felipe Gonzalez has increased in popularity, while he has declined.

In fact, for the first time in all the polls taken by this magazine, the Socialist leader far surpassed the recluse of Moncloa, as the press was beginning to call him at the time. More than twice the number of persons who said that they voted for Suarez for president claimed that they would vote for Felipe Gonzalez (26 percent). And there were many more who thought that Felipe had "improved" (17 percent), as compared with the number who thought that he had "become worse" (10 percent).

In the realm of popularity and credibility for the government's tasks, the opposition gained, while the party in power declined.

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Because what is serious, but also logical, is the fact that the opinion of the leaders has been transferred to the respective political parties.

In fact, in the opinion of those interviewed, UCD [Democratic Center Union] declined in percentages similar to those of its respective leaders, while PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] obtained a higher index of improvement. There is one fact to be stressed, in comparing the leaders with their own parties: In the words of the individuals queried, who represent the nation as a whole, their opinion of Suarez has worsened more than that of UCD; whereas, on the contrary, the opinion of Felipe Gonzalez is better than that of his own party.

Who are the most critical of President Suarez? The data indicate that the "upper" social class is the one expressing the most disillusionment. No less than 41 percent (as compared with the national mean of 28 percent) consider him worse than before. Has the upper bourgeoisie gone over to Socialism? By no means; this social stratum is the only one which claims that Felipe Gonzalez has become worse too (better, 18 percent; worse, 21 percent).

In conclusion, the "rich" who also uphold this opinion of the respective political parties do not associate with either Socialism or the Center. The political preference of a majority of this social stratum unquestionably lies more to the right. Of course, Suarez is not their man. But the poll also reveals that the upper class is the one with a more definite opinion, with very low percentages replying "no answer, don't know." The opposite holds true for the lower class (lower middle and low), which always has a high index of those who do not know what to say, or who give a silent response.

But if those who claim to earn rather high income are annoyed with Suarez and his party, the young people under age 30 are no less so (36 percent claim that he has become worse); nor are the Andalusians (33 percent) and Basques (36 percent). The greatest critics are concentrated here, the majority being men and residents of towns with over 100,000 inhabitants.

However, the women are a different story. They admit that the president has become worse, but only 20 percent, as compared with 37 percent of the men. Among the 30 percent who refused to answer, women still think that politics is not their affair.

The medium and lower classes believe that Felipe Gonzalez has improved, particularly the "lower" class, which gives him the broadest margin between better and worse. The most skeptical about believing that Felipe has improved live in the northern part of the country. The women are also hard on him, and do not appear so kind as they do toward Suarez.

The Television Debate

With the people's confidence lost and with the opposition leader on his heels, for President Suarez the arrival of summer represented something like the saving bell for the injured boxer for whom they are beginning to count to ten.

Once again, the clever Suarez became allied with time. The respite of the holidays, the resignation of his loyal Abril Martorell who sacrificed himself to save him, and

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the entry of the barons on horseback into the government to rescue the party and its president allowed him to recover his image again. Just as in the movies, he was saved at the last minute, when all the viewers were expecting the worst.

The great debate on the motion for censure last May broke all audience records for Spanish television. No one expected that thousands would stay up until dawn to view what was going on in Parliament. Nevertheless, that is what happened. The second network exceeded by 30 percent its largest audience, for its program "The Key," and some 700,000 people more than usual remained glued to the television set, after the late news, to watch the summaries of the debate on the motion for censure.

In spite of everything, the general impression of the debate, when it was time to respond to the poll, was a division of opinion, with those who considered it positive winning by a slight margin. The upper class, which was the one with the largest proportion following it, had for the most part (38 percent) a negative impression; while the motion for censure was considered positive by the middle and lower classes. The women, especially the older ones and those over 50 years of age, either did not like it or did not watch it.

However, a clear majority felt that this type of debate is good for democracy, and useful for solving the country's problems; also expressing the view that it arouses interest in politics, and should occur more often.

According to region, the Catalonians were the ones who followed the debate least, and the Andalusians and those from the north received a more negative impression. Madrid and Barcelona showed an overwhelming number following the debate, matched by their view that the debate was highly constructive.

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(1)

A QUIEN VOTARIA PARA PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO *				
	Sept. 78	Nov. 78	Febr. 79 (1)	Junio 80
Adolfo Suárez	19,9	26,9	26	12,1
Felipe González	14,2	12,7	18	26,0

(2)

POPULARIDAD SUAREZ					
	Sept. 76	Marzo 78	Dic. 78	Marzo 80	Junio 80
(3) Ha mejorado	59,7	11,9	18,2	12,5	4,1
(4) Ha empeorado	6,5	28,3	16,8	28,3	28,4
(5) Permanece igual	428,5	44,1	50,7	36,5	44,2
(6) NS/NC	5,3	15,8	14,4	22,6	23,3

(7)

POPULARIDAD				
	UCD	PSOE	Suárez	Felipe
(3) Ha mejorado	4,3	14,6	4,1	17,1
(4) Ha empeorado ..	26,1	11,1	28,4	10,0
(5) Permanece igual .	47,8	49,4	44,2	48,2
(8) No contesta	21,8	24,8	23,3	24,6

- (9) * En las tres primeras consultas se preguntó: «De estos políticos, ¿cuál le gustaría que fuese el próximo presidente del Gobierno?», y se daba una lista de seis nombres (Suárez, González, Fraga, Areilza, Carrillo y Tierno). En la última encuesta se preguntó: «Si mañana se celebraran elecciones a presidente del Gobierno y los candidatos fueran Adolfo Suárez y Felipe González, ¿a cuál de ellos daría usted con más probabilidad su voto?».
- (10) (1) En enero del 79, víspera de las elecciones generales, se hicieron tres encuestas. El día 2, a la que corresponden estos datos, el día 9 (Suárez, 23; Felipe, 20) y el día 20 (Suárez, 19; Felipe, 21).

Key:

- For whom would you vote for president of the government?
- Suarez' popularity
- Has improved
- Has become worse
- Remains the same
- Don't know, no answer
- Popularity
- No answer
- In the first three polls, it was asked: "Of these politicians, which would you like to be the next president of the government?" and a list of six names was given (Suarez, Gonzalez, Fraga, Areilza, Carrillo and Tierno). In the last poll it was asked: "If elections were held tomorrow for president of the government, and the candidates were Adolfo Suarez and Felipe Gonzalez, for which would you most likely vote?"
- In January 1979, just before the general elections, three polls were taken: on 2 January, the one relating to these data; on 9 January (Suarez 23, Felipe 20); and on 20 January (Suarez 19, Felipe 21).

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(1) OPINION SOBRE SUAREZ Y FELIPE GONZALEZ - JUNIO 1980

	(2) CLASE SOCIAL (3) EDAD (4) SEXO (5) REGION (6) HABITAT												
	TOTAL	Alta Med. Mod.	18-29 30-49 50+	H. M. Cat. Lev. And. Cent. Nort.	-15.000 15-100.000 +100.000	Bar. Mad.							
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	
(19) Ha mejorado	4	5	4	4	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
SUAREZ	17	18	17	20	18	14	23	11	17	20	19	16	15
FELIPE	17	18	17	20	18	14	23	11	17	20	19	16	15
(20) Ha empeorado	28	41	25	28	36	27	24	37	20	21	29	33	25
SUAREZ	10	21	13	8	12	11	8	11	9	9	11	9	8
FELIPE	10	21	13	8	12	11	8	11	9	9	11	9	8
(21) Igual	44	47	55	40	48	45	39	42	46	58	38	45	41
SUAREZ	44	47	55	40	48	45	39	42	46	58	38	45	41
FELIPE	48	52	56	45	34	48	44	48	49	57	30	52	46
(22) Nota: Resto hasta ciento por ciento corresponde a la respuesta -no sabe, no contesta-													

Key:

1. Opinion of Suarez and Felipe Gonzalez, June 1980

2. Social class

3. Age

4. Sex

5. Region

6. Habitat

7. Upper

8. Middle

9. Lower

10. Male

11. Female

12. Catalonia

13. Levant [Southeast]

14. Andalusia

15. Center

16. North

17. Barcelona

18. Madrid

19. Has improved

20. Has become worse

21. The same

22. Note: Remaining percent relates to the answer "Don't know, no answer."

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OPINION SOBRE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS

	(2) CLASE SOCIAL (3) EDAD (4) SEXO				(5) REGION					(6) HABITAT							
	TOTAL	Alta	Med. Modos.	18-29	30-49	50-69	H.	M.	Cat.	Lev.	And.	Cent. Nort.	-15,000	15-100,000	+100,000	Bar.	Med.
(19)																	
1. UCD																	
(20) Ha mejorado	4	7	8	9	3	6	4	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	6	5	17
(21) Ha empeorado	26	37	25	34	25	34	20	34	18	20	23	31	24	22	28	30	29
(22) Permanece igual	48	53	56	45	51	48	45	50	60	35	51	43	47	30	23	19	46
(23) No contesta	22	6	14	26	12	21	31	16	28	16	38	16	23	19	23	17	20
2. PSOE (24)																	
(20) Ha mejorado	15	15	17	14	16	17	10	19	10	15	17	14	14	12	16	17	20
(21) Ha empeorado	11	28	15	8	13	10	10	12	10	11	13	13	7	13	14	14	11
(22) Permanece igual	49	51	54	48	58	49	44	50	49	56	31	58	47	49	45	51	45
(23) No contesta	25	6	14	30	13	24	36	19	32	19	39	16	32	30	23	18	21

Key:

1. Opinion of the Political Parties
2. Social class
3. Age
4. Sex
5. Region
6. Habitat
7. Upper
8. Middle
9. Lower
10. Male
11. Female
12. Catalonia
13. Levant [Southeast]
14. Andalusia
15. Center
16. North
17. Barcelona
18. Madrid
19. Democratic Center Union
20. Has improved
21. Has become worse
22. Remains the same
23. No answer
24. Spanish Socialist Workers Party

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(1) VOTO POSIBLE A PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO

TOTAL	(2) CLASE SOCIAL		(3) EDAD		(4) SEXO		(5) REGION			(6) HABITAT								
	Ac. m. alt.	Media	M. b. media	18-29	30-49	50+	H.	M.	Ca.	Lev.	And.	Cent.	Nort.	2-15	15-100	+100	Bar.	Med.
	(7)	(8)	(9)				(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)				(17)	(18)
Suarez	12.1	18.5	17.4	9.6	10.5	13.1	12.0	9.4	14.9	9.3	8.9	14.2	11.6	11.9	11.9	7.2	8.8	
Felipe González	26.0	22.8	24.2	27.0	25.9	28.2	26.8	24.7	29.3	28.2	27.1	29.2	28.0	29.4	25.3	26.1	27.5	23.6
Ninguno	3.3	4.2	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.2	4.0	3.7	4.3	4.1	3.9	4.2	4.0	4.1	3.9	24.0	27.3	23.6
N.S./N.C.	4.4	10.2	10.0	7.7	9.8	7.6	8.5	9.4	7.5	8.2	5.7	7.3	9.8	10.1	7.2	9.6	11.1	7.2
	30.0	11.6	23.8	34.4	16.7	29.2	42.9	23.4	37.1	32.3	31.3	22.9	39.4	23.0	25.1	27.9	28.9	30.4

Key:

1. Possible Vote for President of the Government

2. Social class

3. Age

4. Sex

5. Region

6. Habitat

7. Upper middle

8. Middle

9. Lower middle, lower

10. Male

11. Female

12. Catalonia

13. Levant [Southeast]

14. Andalusia

15. Center

16. North

17. Barcelona

18. Madrid

19. Neither

20. Would not vote

21. Don't know; no answer

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DEBATE TVE

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
	CLASE SOCIAL	EDAD	SEXO	REGION	HABITAT												
	Media	M. b/modes.	H. M. Cal. Lev. And. Cant. Nort.	2-15 15-100 + 100 Bar. Med.													
TOTAL	Ac. m/h.	30-49 50+	(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)	(17) (18)													
IMPRESION GENERAL																	
(20)	8.2	9.5	9.4	7.9	6.2	10.7	4.7	8.3	10.1	10.6	5.8	5.4	8.0	9.7	14.4	9.7	
(21)	7.8	23.6	19.0	17.0	14.0	23.2	9.5	19.4	16.1	12.5	30.5	13.7	13.6	16.1	16.6	23.2	25.6
(22)	16.6	12.8	14.7	12.5	8.9	12.8	11.1	9.9	11.4	13.7	8.5	17.4	11.7	11.0	14.8	7.2	11.9
(23)	10.7	12.8	14.1	11.0	7.3	11.8	9.5	7.5	12.9	13.7	9.8	10.5	14.2	13.9	17.1	17.0	13.1
(24)	14.8	18.7	13.9	16.2	14.6	13.0	5.1	3.1	6.2	4.5	3.7	2.3	5.8	2.3	2.0	7.0	12.8
(25)	0.4	0.7	2.2	1.7	3.2	17.0	31.8	30.3	16.0	23.7	22.2	25.7	29.6	28.1	19.2	14.4	16.2
(26)	21.1	6.5	16.0	22.7	21.3	27.4	17.0	13.7	5.0	11.5	7.3	17.3	9.2	12.7	9.0	7.0	10.3
(27)	10.2	2.5	5.8	3.9	10.4	15.4	6.8	13.7	5.0	11.5	7.3	17.3	9.2	12.7	9.0	7.0	10.3
BENEFICIAN A LA DEMOCRACIA																	
(29)	47.1	67.9	55.3	47.1	39.7	56.1	37.3	34.6	39.3	47.3	47.9	43.1	39.1	48.9	50.6	59.1	61.4
(30)	21.4	23.5	21.4	23.3	16.5	21.8	20.8	16.5	25.6	27.4	18.3	21.3	20.3	23.2	27.4	17.0	20.2
(31)	31.6	8.6	23.4	29.6	41.7	22.0	41.8	28.9	35.1	25.3	33.9	35.6	40.6	27.9	25.7	23.7	18.5
SON UTILES PARA LA SOLUCION DE LOS PROBLEMAS																	
(29)	41.6	50.2	45.0	42.3	37.6	46.6	36.2	37.4	36.7	45.7	45.5	40.4	34.1	47.1	45.9	45.4	51.1
(30)	29.6	41.9	32.6	31.0	24.8	31.9	27.2	28.8	27.0	40.1	32.4	30.4	29.6	27.6	30.9	31.4	29.5
(31)	28.8	7.9	22.1	26.7	37.5	21.5	36.5	33.8	36.4	14.2	32.1	29.1	36.3	25.3	23.2	23.2	19.3
DESPIERTAN EL INTERES POLITICO DE LOS ESPAÑÓLES																	
(29)	60.5	80.1	67.8	63.7	49.3	64.8	55.8	64.2	53.1	69.6	61.7	50.8	51.1	63.3	67.6	74.2	70.7
(30)	14.3	14.1	14.4	14.1	14.8	16.8	11.7	9.2	13.5	17.7	9.8	22.2	16.0	14.1	13.5	10.3	11.9
(31)	25.2	5.8	18.0	22.3	35.9	18.5	32.5	26.8	33.4	12.7	26.5	27.0	32.9	22.6	18.9	16.0	17.3
DEBERIAN PRODUCIRSE CON MAS FRECUENCIA																	
(29)	53.9	71.6	63.3	53.4	44.8	63.9	44.3	55.6	50.4	62.5	54.5	45.2	45.6	56.6	59.8	63.9	64.5
(30)	18.5	21.6	16.8	20.7	16.9	17.3	19.8	16.2	18.8	20.6	12.5	25.6	19.4	18.8	17.8	17.0	16.8
(31)	27.7	6.8	19.9	24.8	38.6	19.9	36.0	28.2	30.9	16.9	33.1	29.3	35.0	24.7	22.4	19.1	19.0

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Key:

1. Spanish Television Debate
2. Social class
3. Age
4. Sex
5. Region
6. Habitat
7. Upper middle
8. Middle
9. Lower middle, lower
10. Male
11. Female
12. Catalonia
13. Levant [Southeast]
14. Andalusia
15. Center
16. North
17. Barcelona
18. Madrid
19. General impression
20. Very good
21. Good
22. Bad
23. Very bad
24. Neither good nor bad
25. No response, nothing
26. Did not watch debate
27. No answer
28. They benefit democracy
29. Yes
30. No
31. Don't know
32. They are useful for solving problems
33. They arouse Spaniards' interest in politics
34. They should be held more often

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TERRORIST GRAPO FOREIGN CONTACTS--The terrorist organization GRAPO [First of October Anti-Fascist Revolutionary Groups] maintains frequent contacts with the embassies of Algeria, Angola and Benin in Paris. This information was obtained by the Spanish police after the arrest of [GRAPO] leader Enrique Brotons Beneyto, one of the "brains" of the organization. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 19 Oct 80 p 7]

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END

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